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An Update on Red Light Camera Research: 
The Need for Federal Standards in the 
Interest of Public Safety  
 
Barbara Langland-Orban, PhD, John T. Large, PhD, Etienne E. Pracht, PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since publishing our critique of red light camera (RLC) studies in 2008, we have gained increased insights on the 
controversy over RLCs. Herein we provide additional information on RLCs, and use a question-and-answer format 
to address frequently asked questions. This update includes the rationale given for ignoring fatalities at RLC sites, 
the convergence in findings from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's compendium of best RLC 
studies, common violations of research methods in RLC evaluations, the RLC cost-to-benefit implications for 
motorists, an explanation for the increase in rear-end crashes at RLC sites, and why RLCs may be ineffective in 
reducing red light running crashes. We conclude with a proposed solution: restoring and improving federal 
standards through the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices to assure proper intersection engineering prior 
to consideration of RLCs (even though RLCs are not recognized as an established safety device).   
Florida Public Health Review, 2011; 8, 1-9. 
Background 
In 2008, we published our first critique of red 
light camera (RLC) studies (Langland-Orban, Pracht, 
& Large, 2008). The function of RLCs is to 
photograph vehicles that enter an intersection on a 
red light, which results in a citation that carries a fine. 
The public health concern with RLCs is the increase 
in crashes and injuries being reported in some 
studies. 
Our critique reviewed five major RLC studies. 
Four were identified in the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Automated 
Enforcement: A Compendium of Worldwide 
Evaluations of Results (Decina, Thomas, Srinivasan, 
& Staplin, 2007), as among the best in meeting 
NHTSA’s data and research design standards among 
75 RLC studies reviewed. The fifth was published in 
the American Journal of Public Health (Retting & 
Kyrychenko, 2002) and was the only publication 
identified in a medical library search for peer-
reviewed publications on RLCs. The five studies had 
contradictory findings with differences due primarily 
to the varying adherence to research methodological 
rigor. The studies that best adhered to scientific 
research methods found RLCs were associated with 
increases in crashes and injuries. 
The basic standards used for assessing validity 
when reviewing these studies were derived from 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) and the Office of the 
House Majority Leader's report on red light cameras 
(2001), which included the following points: 
 Selection bias should not be evident in the 
choice of RLC or comparison sites used in 
the evaluation; 
 Outcomes from the RLC sites should be 
separately analyzed and not merged with 
untreated or dissimilar sites; 
 Angle, rear-end, and total crashes (and 
injury crashes) should be included as 
outcome measures; 
 Variables that need to be controlled for must 
be included in the statistical analysis, such 
as traffic volume, yellow light timings, and a 
time trend as red light running crashes and 
injuries are declining over time absent the 
use of cameras; 
 At least one year of data should be evaluated 
in both before and during camera time 
periods; and 
 Findings from the statistical analysis should 
be fully disclosed, including confidence 
intervals and statistical significance. 
       After publishing our criticisms of the Retting and 
Kyrychenko study, Mr. Retting subsequently 
challenged our criticisms (Smyth, 2008). We 
responded by replicating his published analysis, 
which affirmed Retting and Kyrychenko (2002) had 
incorrectly reported their findings, as well as used 
flawed research methods. Our replication, which 
explains the errors, is published in an e-letter with the 
original article in the American Journal of Public 
Health on-line (Large, Orban, & Pracht, 2008). 
        Since publishing our critique we have provided 
approximately 80 interviews to news reporters 
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throughout the U.S., Canada, and England. Our 
findings were broadly circulated in the news media; 
however, to date, only two elected officials have 
contacted us about our conclusions. This lack of 
interest among elected officials was profiled in a 
news article about sources of information used in 
RLC decision making, which illustrated the tactics 
used by industry proponents to foster confusion about 
RLC effectiveness (Van Sickler, 2010).  
        One journal reporter, who requested anonymity, 
revealed that the media can be a source of 
misinformation on RLCs. She disclosed that special 
interests that profit from cameras have threatened to 
reduce or withdraw their advertising revenues if the 
news is not reported that RLCs provide a safety 
benefit. The reporter explained that with such threats, 
journalistic ethics permit an editor to report the 
advertiser's perspective if also disclosing the contrary 
assessment that RLCs pose a safety threat, leaving 
readers to form their own conclusion. However, she 
explained that not all editors abide by this principle, 
which is compounded by the many controversies 
surrounding RLCs. For example, a Florida newspaper 
reported that their local poll found support for RLCs. 
The second half of the article mentioned some of the 
concerns about RLCs, which included using them to 
generate revenue, failing to save lives, failing to 
significantly reduce crashes, and increasing rear-end 
crashes (Thalji, 2010). However, the most important 
controversy was not mentioned: RLCs have been 
associated with an increase in injury crashes. While 
the reported controversies are true, the public health 
concern with RLCs is the increase in injury crashes, 
and possibly fatal crashes, as explained in the 
following sections. 
        Because we are continually being queried on our 
research, we provide highlights of our findings in a 
question-and-answer format. Our purpose is to 
communicate facts about RLCs by providing new 
information and to answer questions frequently asked 
by the news media.  
 
What was learned about fatalities at RLC 
intersections?   
        In our original critique (Langland-Orban et al., 
2008), we faulted the research methods used in the 
Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) analysis 
titled Safety Evaluation of Red-Light Cameras 
(Council, Persaud, Eccles, Lyon, and Griffith, 2005). 
One FHWA official subsequently contacted us to 
point out that we overlooked an important finding: 
fatal crashes at RLC sites had increased, yet were 
ignored in the related economic analysis.  
        Council et al. (2005, p. 68) report the percent of 
fatal angle crashes increased in the after-camera 
period, as 0.5 percent of angle injury crashes were 
fatal before camera use and 0.8 percent were fatal 
after camera use. Using this information and their 
results from the seven jurisdictions, it was possible 
for us to calculate that the number of fatal angle 
crashes for the 370 RLC site years was expected to 
be 4.5 based on before camera data. However, the 
actual number of fatal angle crashes was 5.0 in the 
after-camera period, which is more than 10% higher 
than expected. Further, for every 100 definite injuries 
from angle crashes in the before-camera period, 1.28 
was fatal, which increased to 1.71 in the after-camera 
period, a 33.6% increase. Therefore, increased, and 
not decreased, fatalities were associated with the use 
of RLCs in this study.    
        Additionally, the cost of fatal crashes was 
omitted from the Council et al. economic analysis. 
The rationale cited by the authors was that "small 
numbers of fatalities should not be allowed to affect 
decisions on roadway-based treatments such as 
RLCs" (pp. 48-49). They suggest that fatalities at 
RLC sites can be ignored because they most likely 
result from a person's age (e.g., elderly) or failure to 
use a safety belt, or relate to the type of vehicle 
driven. Council et al. (2005) further explained they 
excluded the cost of fatal crashes in their economic 
analysis because the cost of a single fatal crash 
"could significantly bias the results” due to the 
limited number of fatal and serious crashes in their 
study. In other words, the authors spotlight the 
statistical difficulties of including the cost of 
fatalities, while ignoring the practical implications of 
such events. Consequently, their estimated annual 
crash cost savings of $38,845 per RLC site is 
overestimated since the cost of fatal crashes was 
excluded.  
        Using their data, the actual estimated cost of an 
angle injury crash was $82,816 before RLCs and 
$100,176 after RLCs were implemented, as shown in 
Table 1. Instead of using these actual costs, the 
FHWA study used $64,468 for all angle injury 
crashes. It appears they averaged the cost of angle 
injury crashes for the before and after RLC time 
periods (excluding fatal crash costs), even though the 
cost of an angle injury crash was higher after RLCs 
were used.  
        As the Council et al. study (2005) is often cited 
by RLC proponents, the findings should be 
reconsidered in terms of actual crash counts, in 
addition to the percent changes reported. They report 
that RLCs were associated with a 25% reduction in 
angle crashes and a 15% increase in rear-end crashes. 
However, because rear-end crashes are more frequent 
than angle crashes, the total number of crashes (angle 
plus rear-end) was unchanged following RLC use. 
Further, the estimated reduction in injury crashes was  
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Estimated   Before Camera  After Camera 
Code Injury Severity 
Cost of Angle 
Crash  
% of 
Total Weighted Cost  
% of 
Total Weighted Cost 
K Fatal $0  0.50% $0.00  0.80% $0 
A 
Incapacitating 
Injury $120,810  7.70% $9,302  8.50% $10,269 
B Non-severe injury $103,468  30.80% $31,868  37.40% $38,697 
C Possible injury $34,690  61.10% $21,196  53.30% $18,490 
Average (excluding cost of fatalities)  100% $62,366  100% $67,456 
K Fatal $4,090,042  0.50% $20,450  0.80% $32,720 
Actual Average (including cost of fatalities)   $82,816   $100,176 
 
 
23 fewer definite injury crashes over 370 RLC site 
years (i.e., 132 RLC sites over multiple years), which 
is equivalent to each RLC site having one less 
definite injury crash every 16 years. Regardless, fatal 
angle crashes increased following RLC use, as did 
the estimated cost of angle injury crashes. Despite the 
flaws in the assumptions and analysis, the FHWA 
study (Council et al., 2005) continues to be posted on 
the Federal Highway Administration web site as 
purported evidence of RLC effectiveness (Federal 
Highway Administration, 2010).    
 
Of the seven studies identified by the NHTSA 
compendium as the best observational RLC 
research, is there any consensus in the findings? 
        There is convergence: none of the seven studies 
identified as the best in design and data in the 
NHTSA's compendium (Decina et al., 2007) 
statistically permit concluding RLCs provide a safety 
benefit. Further, three of the seven studies report 
increases in injury crashes. The methods and actual 
results from each of the seven observational studies 
must be reviewed to understand what each found, as 
the executive summaries are often misleading or 
incomplete. The studies' findings are summarized 
below.   
 As discussed above, Council et al. (2005) 
found that RLCs were not associated with a 
meaningful reduction in crashes or injuries, 
particularly as fatal angle crashes increased 
following RLC use, as did the estimated cost 
of angle injury crashes.     
 Burkey and Obeng (2004) reported a 
significant increase in crashes and "possible 
injury" crashes.   
 
 Garber, Miller, Abel, Eslambolchi, and 
Korukonda (2007), using Empirical Bayes, 
reported RLCs were associated with a 
significant increase in crashes, including 
angle crashes and injury crashes, three 
fatalities, and no significant change in red 
light running crashes.   
 Synectics Transportation Consultants (2003) 
reported a two percent increase in fatal and 
injury crashes at RLC sites, whereas 
comparison sites experienced a 12.7 percent 
decrease.   
 Washington and Shin (2005) reported no 
change in total crashes at RLC sites in 
Phoenix, Arizona, and reported an 11% 
decrease in total crashes in Scottsdale, 
Arizona. However, the change in Scottsdale 
was not significant as the confidence 
interval overlaps with that of the comparison 
intersections (p. 90). Also, page 18 of their 
report reveals the comparison sites were 
distinctly dissimilar from the RLC sites. 
Comparison sites averaged 0.82 crashes 
annually, whereas RLC sites averaged 33.77 
crashes. Thus, the selection of comparison 
sites in Scottsdale directly violates research 
standards required for internal validity 
pertaining to statistical regression and biases 
in differential selection of the comparison 
group (Campbell & Stanley, 1963, p. 5). 
Finally, the percent of fatal angle crashes in 
Scottsdale was higher at RLC sites than at 
"all intersections" (p. 95), and their 
economic analysis excluded the cost of fatal 
crashes since it was modeled after the 
Council et al. study (2005), meaning the 
crash cost savings were overestimated. 
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 The Butler (2001) study was not accessible 
to us; however, the NHTSA compendium 
reported it but did not find a significant 
safety benefit to cameras.   
 Cunningham and Hummer (2004) merged 
outcomes from RLC approaches with non-
RLC approaches, meaning their findings are 
not specific to RLC sites.  
        More recently, an analysis published in the 
Journal of Trauma (Wahl et al., 2010) reported an 
RLC program was ineffective in producing a safety 
benefit. The authors suggested alternative 
interventions should be pursued.    
 
Some studies are reported to use "unscientific" 
research methods. What does this mean? 
        The NHTSA's compendium (Decina et al., 
2007) criticized some RLC review studies for failing 
to control for other sources of variation in the 
outcome measure. The criticism stems from these 
studies failing to account for other factors that can 
increase or decrease crashes, such as changes in 
traffic volume or a long running time trend of 
declining injury crashes. A common error among 
inexperienced researchers is to make simple before 
and after comparisons. Decina et al. (2007) identified 
the following RLC review studies as violating this 
research tenet, meaning these reports should not be 
used in RLC decision making: 
 Cochrane Collaboration (Aeron-Thomas & 
Hess, 2005);  
 Transportation Research Board (McGee & 
Eccles, 2003);  
 Traffic Injury Prevention (Retting, 
Ferguson, & Hakkert, 2003);  
 Road and Transport Research (Hakkert & 
Gitelman, 2004); and  
 Proceeding from Transportation Research 
Board conferences (Flannery & Maccubbin, 
2002; Persaud, Council, Lyon, Eccles, & 
Griffith, 2005).   
        To illustrate the importance of including 
meaningful variables in a study, Table 2 provides the 
variables integrated into each of the five analyses that 
we critiqued in 2008. The studies that integrated 
relevant independent variables in the analysis found 
RLCs were associated with increases in crashes and 
injuries. This reveals the complexity of conducting 
public health research because an outcome can be 
incorrectly attributed to an intervention if variables 
necessary to explain the outcome are excluded. 
        Another type of research flaw in some RLC 
studies is the use of a process measure, such as 
violations or traffic citations, instead of an actual 
safety outcome, e.g., crashes or injuries. Unlike 
crashes, citations are "endogenous," meaning 
officials responsible for issuing citations directly 
control the number issued. For example, Retting, 
Williams, Farmer, and Feldman (1999) studied 
violations, not crashes. In contrast, Wahl et al. (2010) 
analyzed violations and crashes and found violations 
decreased following RLC use, but crashes did not, 
meaning RLCs were ineffective in reducing crashes. 
Also, Lum and Wong (2003) studied stopping 
propensity at yellow lights, without analyzing the 
association between stopping propensity and crashes. 
It is not possible to make conclusions about safety 
associated with RLCs if the impact on crashes and 
injuries is not evaluated.  
 
Is there an economic incentive in using RLCs? 
        RLC vendors and government entities clearly 
can receive an economic benefit from cameras, in 
addition to automobile insurance companies that use 
RLC tickets as a basis for increasing a driver's 
insurance rate. However, RLCs are merely an 
expense for motorists. Even if using the FHWA study 
(Council et al, 2005), which estimated annual crash 
cost savings per RLC site as $38,845 (excluding the 
cost of fatal crashes), it affirms RLCs are 
economically disadvantageous to motorists. The 
estimated savings must be considered relative to the 
cost to motorists to achieve the savings. For example, 
in Temple Terrace, Florida, RLCs were installed in 
two directions at two intersections, for a total of four 
RLC sites. If believing the estimated annual savings 
of $38,845 per site, the annual estimated crash cost 
savings to Temple Terrace drivers and/or their 
insurance companies would be $155,380 ($38,845 
per site, multiplied by four sites). In the first year, 
21,000 RLC tickets were issued in Temple Terrace, 
primarily to drivers making right turns (Shopes, 
2009; Cohn, 2009). At $125 per citation, the cost 
assessed to ticketed drivers was $2.6 million, which 
greatly exceeds the estimated crash cost savings of 
$155,380. This difference is an extremely adverse 
cost-to-benefit relationship for affected motorists, 
particularly as crashes were reported to increase at 
Temple Terrace RLC sites. The use of RLCs has a 
double negative effect for motorists, as they are put 
more at risk for both a fine and a crash. 
        Citations can become a taxation method. A 
study by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
evaluated ticketing in North Carolina over a 14-year 
period, and found the issuance of tickets increased in 
the year following a decline in municipality revenues. 
The authors concluded tickets are not just used for 
public safety, but also to generate revenue (Garrett & 
Wagner, 2006). As a taxation method, RLCs are 
highly inefficient due to the large percentage of 
revenues that accrues to private out-of-state vendors, 
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which diminishes funds available within a 
community for investments and/or consumer 
purchases, thereby reducing the volume of money 
flowing through local businesses. 
        Due to the adverse cost-to-benefit relationship 
for motorists, citizens in some communities have 
placed referendums on local ballots, allowing voters 
to decide on banning RLCs in their community. For 
example, in November 2010, voters in Houston, 
Texas, voted to ban RLCs, which had produced more 
than $44 million in fines from 2006 to 2010 
(Pinkerton & Olson, 2010).   
 
If RLCs are associated with large increases in 
rear-end crashes, does this imply that drivers are 
following too closely? 
        Rear-end crashes can occur even when trailing 
drivers are abiding by speed limits and following 
distance guides, which is explained using Florida's 
rear-end presumption law and the mathematics 
underlying rear-end crashes. Since 1958, Florida case 
law holds a rebuttable presumption that the trailing 
driver in a rear-end collision is the sole cause of an 
accident (McNulty v. Cusack, 1958). One established 
rebuttal to this presumption is abrupt and arbitrary 
braking in accelerating traffic. The Florida Supreme 
Court ruled: "Abrupt and arbitrary braking in 
bumper-to-bumper, accelerating traffic is an 
irresponsible and dangerous act that invites a 
collision...It is a sudden stop by the preceding driver 
at a time and place where it could not reasonably be 
expected by the following driver that creates the 
factual issue" (Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 
2000). 
        This ruling acknowledges the hazards of abrupt 
stops. Unfortunately, RLCs encourage abrupt stops, 
which are not always anticipated by trailing drivers. 
Abrupt braking is dangerous because drivers attempt 
to stop as quickly as possible, yet drivers need 
different distances to stop due to differences in driver 
reaction times and in distances needed by different 
types of vehicles to stop.    
        Stopping has three basic steps: (1) the driver's 
perception time to changing road conditions that 
require braking followed by the reaction time to 
initiate braking, (2) the vehicle response time to 
engage the brakes, and (3) the distance needed to stop 
once the brakes engage, which is determined by 
speed, road conditions, vehicle type, and tire quality. 
The total time for driver perception and reaction can 
range from about one to two seconds, which means a 
trailing driver closes the distance to the forward 
vehicle in the process of braking, before their brakes 
engage. Vehicles are separated by two seconds of 
driving time if using the "Two Second Rule," which 
is the following distance guide recommended in the 
Official Florida Driver's Handbook (Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 2010). 
However, since the range for driver reaction times to 
braking includes two seconds, the trailing driver's 
brakes can engage at or beyond the same place on the 
road where the forward vehicle's brakes engaged, and 
a rear-end crash is likely to occur if the trailing 
vehicle requires a longer stopping distance. The 
forward driver's ability to quickly stop affects the 
distance available to trailing drivers, making abrupt 
stops hazardous. 
 
Why would RLCs not reduce red light running 
crashes?  
        Of the seven studies identified as best in the 
NHTSA compendium, only Garber et al. (2007) 
specifically analyzed crashes caused by red light 
running, as the others used the broader category of all 
angle crashes, regardless of the cause. Using EB 
analysis, Garber et al. found no significant change in 
red light running crashes at RLC sites. A possible 
explanation is that the majority of red light running 
crashes result from unintentional, rather than 
intentional, red light running. For example, when 
intentional red light running occurs immediately after 
the signal changing to red, cross traffic has not been 
released and the likelihood of a crash is low. In 
contrast, unintentional red light running is hazardous 
because cross traffic can be in the intersection when 
the infraction occurs. The failure of RLCs to reduce 
red light running crashes is consistent with crashes 
occurring from unintentional red light running. 
Further, the Garber et al. (2007) study reveals that 
angle crashes are not a good proxy for red light 
running crashes since they found red light running 
crashes did not significantly change at RLC sites, 
whereas angle crashes significantly increased.   
        Understanding root causes of red light running 
crashes (e.g., intentional versus unintentional 
infractions, driving under the influence, or traffic 
signal or intersection defects) is necessary to advance 
remedies that are specific to the problem. In contrast, 
RLC advocates presume red light running crashes 
occur from willful red light running.  
 
Does a mutually agreeable resolution exist among 
RLC proponents and opponents? 
        When the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) identified motor vehicle safety as 
one of the top 10 public health accomplishments of 
the 20th Century, it was, in part, attributed to the 
federal government being given the authority in 1966 
to advance safety by establishing standards for roads 
and intersections (CDC, 1999). The Federal Highway 
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Table 2. Variables Included in RLC Evaluations Critiqued in 2008 
 
Found RLCs Associated with Increased 
Crashes/Injuries 
 Reported a Safety 
Benefit to RLCs 
 Burkey & Garber   Council Retting & 
  Obeng et al.* Synectics*  et al. Kyrychenko 
Average daily traffic volume X X X  
One volume 
used for all 
time periods 
 
Amber (yellow) signal time X X 
Set per 
regulations 
   
Speed limit on major road X X     
Left turn lanes on road X X     
Through lanes on number of lanes X X     
Time  X (month) X (year)     
Percent of trucks on major road  X     
All-red clearance interval X      
Right turn lane X      
Sidewalk at intersection X      
Solid median at intersection X      
Pedestrian signal at intersection X      
No left or right turn on red signs X      
Snow X      
Precipitation X      
*Garber et al. and Synectics Transportation Consultants accounted for intersection geometry in selecting comparison 
intersections, therefore their statistical analysis did not need to incorporate these (control) variables. 
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Administration's Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices (2009) establishes standards to achieve 
uniformity in traffic control throughout the nation. 
Federal standards are needed regarding RLC 
programs to assure intersection safety, even though 
RLCs were not found to be an evidence-based safety 
intervention in studies identified as the best RLC 
research (Decina et al., 2007). Such standards would 
not preclude states from enacting laws that prohibit 
the use of RLCs, as some states have already done: 
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, West Virginia, and Wisconsin 
(Copeland, 2010), or establishing more stringent 
standards regarding yellow light timings, as occurred 
in Georgia.   
        Instead of establishing standards for RLCs, the 
FHWA and NHTSA (2003) issued "guidelines" that 
recommend an engineering analysis and 
improvements prior to considering RLCs, but did not 
mandate such. Consequently, RLCs can be used at 
intersections with engineering defects, which, if 
corrected, would all but eliminate red light running. It 
is a false dichotomy to assume the existence of only 
two alternatives, to either do nothing or use RLCs, as 
the evidence-based remedy is to make engineering 
improvements, particularly lengthening yellow light 
timings.    
        As reported in the Office of the House Majority 
Leader's report (2001), federal standards for traffic 
signal timings were relaxed in 2000, allowing for 
shorter yellow light timings while permitting the use 
of enforcement (tickets) and making the all-red 
clearance interval optional. These changes were 
contrary to accepted safety standards, but necessary 
to allow RLC programs to be profitable, as well as to 
create the appearance of an epidemic of red light 
running for the public. The former standards must be 
restored and strengthened if the goal is to maximize 
public safety.     
        RLC proponents have said they agree with 
correctly engineered intersections. If true, they 
should also agree with restoring the former standards 
and requiring an engineering analysis, with any 
indicated improvements, prior to consideration of 
RLCs. Further, full disclosure of the number of "red 
light running" crashes at an intersection, as a 
consideration for implementation of RLCs, should be 
required to prohibit the obfuscation that occurs by 
reporting angle crashes or total crashes, as the 
majority are typically unrelated to red light running.  
        At present, the Federal Highway 
Administration's (FHWA) web site, titled "Red Light 
Cameras/Automated Enforcement" (2010), creates 
confusion about RLC effectiveness. The FHWA web 
site states RLCs reduce the "number of red light 
running crashes," and provides a link to the Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety's web site, which is an 
association funded by automobile insurance 
companies. Oddly, the FHWA web site does not 
reference the two studies identified as among the best 
RLC studies in the NHTSA compendium (Decina, 
2007), which adhered to scientific research methods. 
Both concluded RLCs were associated with increases 
in crashes and injuries. They were conducted in 
Virginia (Garber et al., 2007) and North Carolina 
(Burkey & Obeng, 2004). In 2008, by email, we 
suggested the FHWA include these studies on their 
web site. An email response was received from the 
FHWA's Office of Safety Design (D. Warren, 
personal communication, June 13, 2008), which 
stated the following intentions: 
 
We intend to add links to technical reports on this 
topic that were prepared using federal funds 
including the Virginia and North Carolina reports 
you mentioned as well as a recent worldwide critical 
evaluation of results published by NHTSA. 
 
        Although this response was sent more than two 
years ago, the FHWA web site has not been modified 
to include the two credible studies. 
        A parallel problem has emerged with the use of 
speed cameras, suggesting a need for improved 
federal standards to assure speed limits are correctly 
set. The FHWA official who contacted us also 
informed us that, similar to RLCs, roadway 
engineering can be manipulated to increase speed 
camera tickets by setting speed limits that are less 
than what safety requires. The FHWA official 
explained this increases the percentage of people who 
are defined as speeders, thereby increasing the 
number of speed camera tickets issued as drivers 
choose speeds perceived as safe, not always attending 
to changes in posted speed limits. 
        It is important for the public at large and federal, 
state, and local officials to understand that motor 
vehicle safety is advanced through evidence-based 
methods. Attempts to generate revenue through 
traffic citations are directly contrary to public safety 
since infractions are increased by improper roadway 
engineering, creating hazards and expense for the 
public.   
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